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Abstract. We propose a big data architecture for analysing database connection 
logs across different instances of databases within an  intranet comprising over 
10,000 users and associated devices. Our system uses Flume  agents 
sending notifications to Hadoop Distributed File System for long-term storage 
and Elasticsearch and Kibana for short-term visualisations, effectively creating 
a data lake for the extraction of log data. We adopt machine learning models 
with an ensemble of approaches to filter and process the indicators within the 
data, and aim to predict anomalies or outliers using feature vectors built from 
this log data. 
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1   Introduction
The project is to build a scalable and secure and central repository capable of storing 
consolidated audit data comprising listener, alert and OS log events generated by 
database instances. This platform will be used for extraction of data in order to filter 
outliers utilising machine learning approaches. The reports will provide a holistic 
view of activity across all oracle databases and the alerting mechanism will detect and 
alert on abnormal activity including network intrusion and usage patterns [1]. 
Database connection logs are analysed to flag potentially anomalous or malicious 
connections to the database instances within the network of the European 
Organisation for Nuclear Research (CERN).  We utilise this research to shed light 
on patterns within the network in order to better understand the temporal 
dependencies and implement them in the decision-making process within the 
CERN system. These models are trained on subsets of a data lake that comprises 
daily connection logs across all instances of databases on the network. The data 
lake comprises Javascript Object Notation (JSON) logs that may be visualised 
using short-term storage, Elasticsearch, Grafana and Kibana or pushed to long-
term storage on Hadoop Distributed File Storage (HDFS). We extract subsets of 
this data and apply models that vary based on different parameters of the data, 
and enable us to classify the outliers among the dataset as anomalies. 
1.1   Database Instances in the CERN Network
Fig 1. Overview of the Database System at CERN [2]
CERN follows an open access policy for most of its internal systems which extends to 
a  significant  percentage  of  database  instances  across  the  organisation.  While  this 
reduces the rule-based access control load on the system, it leads to a number of novel 
issues  including  but  not  limited  to  an  unnecessarily  large  number  of  connection 
requests,  connections accessing more resources than necessary,  misused or abused 
credentials  and  more  security-oriented  issues  such  as  malware  causing  repetitive 
connections from a host machine.
The CERN network comprises 10,000 active users and 1,500 different users [1] each 
with devices, including personal and officially supplied equipment. While most of the 
software installed on the systems is regulated and updates are managed centrally, 
there is considerable privilege afforded to a user to manage device personally and 
consequently the loopholes for the installation of user-defined software or scripts. 
These can end up being not only inefficient but also malicious in their operation, 
raising multiple issues within the system. Specifically, these systems might be 
compromised and utilised to either initiate multiple (spam) connections or use stolen 
credentials with malicious intent. There are numerous security issues with such a 
setup if there is unmonitored access to database instances. It can be used in multiple 
manners to throw the network into disarray due to the load on servers.  We aim to use 
some concrete approaches in analysing these database connections by building 
models that can accurately fit this data and classify further connection requests by 
evaluating the likelihood of being anomalous. The architecture used to store this log 
data needs to have a low footprint and support real-time analytical pipelines reliant on 
time-series and sequence-based approaches.  
2   Log Data Storage
Fig 2. Current Architecture for Storage of Log Data [3] 
Database connection logs comprise multiple parameters per successfully established 
or failed connection which are utilised in building the feature vector for analysis. The 
architecture comprises of multiple instances of Oracle databases each of which have 
an Apache Flume agent running on it. Apache Flume is a reliable and distributed 
service for efficiently collecting, clustering, and transporting large amounts of data, 
often comprising system logs. The system architecture for this service encapsulates 
the concepts of data streaming flows. Flume offers reliability due to the arsenal of 
failover and recovery mechanisms incorporated into a tuneable set of options. The 
simplified data model allows for extensible online analytical implementation. It offers 
unprecedented scalability, reliability and performance [4]. Flume supports sources 
such as Avro, Thrift or logs, and a variety of sinks. It runs in the background, 
eliminating the need for scheduling jobs, and ensures all updates are streamed to 
HDFS as the configuration permits. In case of systems that do not load data directly, 
Flume provides an integration that allows for CSV and log data to be supported. [5]. 
Oracle Real Application Clusters (RAC) is an Oracle Database version involving 
clustering of instances across the system. It provides a comprehensive, high-
availability stack that can be used as the foundation of a database cloud system as 
well as a shared infrastructure, ensuring high availability, scalability, and agility for 
any application [6]. The log data is transported via a central Flume Collector to 
Elasticsearch and Kibana for short-term  storage primarily meant for data 
visualisation and long-term storage on HDFS. 
2.1 Log Data Fields 
The log consists of a number of different fields each with a value corresponding to the 
details of the connection. Some of the important connection details include fields such 
as timestamp, client_program (software that the client uses to connect), client_host 
(host from where the client connects; not necessarily specified), client_ip (IP address 
of the client), client_port (port used to connect), client_protocol (network protocol 
that the client uses to initiate connection), client_user (username provided to initiate 
connection), and so on. 
Fig 3. Extracting User Connection Details to Build a Feature Vector  
3   Anomaly Detection
Fig 4.  An Overview of Strategies for Outlier Detection [7]
Anomaly Detection is the process of identifying unusual or outlying data from a given 
dataset. It has been a subject of interest as the amount of data available for analysis 
rises  disproportionately  as  compared  to  the  amount  of  available  tagged  data. 
Specifically, we utilise features extracted from established connection logs in order to 
determine the outliers for a given subset of temporal data obtained from a data lake. 
The data inherently possesses some degree of contamination which is why we set a 
clustering threshold as a cutoff for percentage of outliers within a data slice.
Models  employed  include  K-Nearest  neighbours,  K-Means  Clustering,  Isolation 
Forests, Local Outlier Factor, and One-Class Support Vector Machines. Our results 
are based on a common subset of anomalies obtained from a majority of distance, 
density and classification approaches utilised for outlier detection.
Table 1.  Comparison of Thresholds for Outliers across Models. 
Approach Title Outliers
Distance K-Nearest Neighbours 2%
Distance K-Means Clustering -
Density Isolation Forests 3%
Density Local Outlier Factor 5%
Classification One-Class SVM 2%
4   Conclusion 
Hadoop and its assortment of components provide a well-established solution for data 
warehousing and provide a reliable pipeline for the transport, storage and streaming 
of log data produced by control systems at CERN. Spark is a system that has proven 
to be scalable in streaming applications when used in tandem with Hadoop. Further, it 
supports querying in SQL that simplifies the learning curve for users, should such a 
use-case arise. From our tests we find that the choice of the storage engine is very 
important  for  the  overall  performance  of  the  system.  The  system  can  efficiently 
handle data synchronisation and perform near real-time change propagation. 
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